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1. Introduction 
 
The meteoric rise in cybercrime has been an issue of pressing concern to businesses and 
consumers in India. Among the Indian organizations, which responded to KPMG’s (2014) 
Cybercrime Survey report 2014, 89% considered cybercrime as a “major threat” (p, 3). One 
estimate suggested that 42 million Indians were victimized online in 2011 (indolink.com, 2012). 
 
As early as in 2009, it was reported in some Indian cities such as Mumbai in India, there had 
been more cybercrime cases were registered with the police than conventional crimes (Hindustan 
Times, 2009). According to a 2016 report of the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) 11,592 
cases of cybercrime cases were registered in India in 2015 (Das, 2017). This is more than 300% 
increase of the 2009 level when there were 2,866 reported cybercrime incidents (Economictimes, 
2012). 
 
India also generates cybercrimes that affect Internet users worldwide. For instance, according to 
the U.S.-based Internet Crime Control Centre, India ranked fifth in the number of complaints 
received by the agency (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2011). As an example, in 2012, the 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued the California-based American Credit Crunchers. 
According to the FTC, an Indian company associated with American Credit Crunchers made 
threatening calls to U.S. consumers with histories of applying for payday loans, which are short-
term, high-interest loans that are typically applied online. Agents in India with massive amount 
of personal data allegedly called potential victims and threatened dire consequences if the 
fictitious loans of up to US$2,000 were not repaid. U.S. consumers had lost over US$5 million to 
the scam, which had been in operation for two years (Shaftel and Narayan, 2012). Likewise, 
India was the top origin country for spam in 2011 and 2012. Similarly, a phishing survey 
released by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) in April 2012 found that India had the 
highest phishing top-level domain (TLD) by domain score (calculated as phish per 10,000 
domains) in the second half (H2) of 2011 (Kshetri, 2015b). 
 
Factors such as cybercrime’s relative newness in the country and resource constraints have led to 
a poor cybersecurity orientation and weak defense measures among consumers, businesses and 
government agencies (Kshetri, 2013). According to a study of the Security and Defense Agenda, 
a Brussels-based think-tank, India is among countries most vulnerable to cyberattacks due to a 
lack of systems and procedures to defend among the public and private sector (Blitz, 2011). 
 
Due partly to the above trends, many initiatives and efforts of the government and private sector 
actors have emerged to strengthen cybersecurity in the country. Table 1 presents some of the key 
initiatives on the cybersecurity front. As a major recent regulatory initiative, in July 2013, the 
government of India (GOI) released the National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP), which had 14 
objectives that included enhancing the protection of critical infrastructure and developing 
500,000 skilled cybersecurity professionals in the next five years. The NCSP was formulated in 
response to domestic and international pressure to enhance cybersecurity measures. 
 
Table 1. The evolution of cybersecurity-related initiatives in India: Major events 
Time Event 
October 2000 Information Technology Act, 2000 came into force. 
2006 Cyber Appellate Tribunal (CAT) started functioning. 
2008 NASSCOM established the DSCI. 
December 2008 Information Technology (Amendment) Bill 2008 passed by Indian Parliament 
February 2009 The IT (Amendment) Act 2008 received the assent of the President 
October 2009 The IT (Amendment) Act 2008 came into force. 
2011 
The central bank, RBI introduced a set of recommendations, which include the formation 
of separate information security groups within banks and maintenance of adequate 
cybersecurity resources based on their size and scope of operation. 
October 2012 Cybersecurity joint working group (JWG) released its “Engagement with Private Sector on Cyber Security” report. 
July 2013 
The government released the NCSP, which set forth 14 objectives that included enhancing 
the protection of critical infrastructure and developing 500,000 skilled cybersecurity 
professionals in the next five years. 
 April 2017 The IRDAI issued guideline, which require all insurance companies to appoint a CISO. 
 
Private sector actors such as the National Association of Software and Services Companies 
(NASSCOM) have also taken measures to strengthen India’s cybersecurity standards. For 
example, the Data Security Council of India—a self-regulatory member organization set up by 
NASSCOM—imposes a fine of up to US$1 million for member companies that fail to secure 
data (Kshetri, 2016b). 
 
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are probably the most notable feature of the Indian 
cybersecurity landscape and an appropriate institutional means of dealing with underdeveloped 
cybersecurity-related institutions. For instance, a key component of NCSP is the development of 
PPP efforts to enhance the cybersecurity landscape. Note that PPPs are especially well-suited for 
areas that require diverse types of expertise and knowledge to address complex problems, 
including cybersecurity (Yu and Qu, 2012). 
 
In light of the above observations, our goal in this paper is aimed at providing an overview of 
current cybersecurity landscape in India. We examine regulations and enforcement, governance 
mechanisms, functions of relevant actors as well as challenges and opportunities facing India on 
the cybersecurity front. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We proceed by first examining the regulatory environment 
related to cybersecurity in India. Next, we discuss private sector initiatives and market 
mechanisms in India in this evolving phenomenon. Then, we look at the public–private 
partnership in cybersecurity. It is followed by a section on discussion and implications. The final 
section provides concluding comments. 
 
2. The Regulatory Environment 
 
India is strengthening cybersecurity-related regulatory and enforcement capacity (Kshetri, 
2016a). India is among the first developing countries to criminalize cybercrimes by enacting the 
IT Act in 2000. India’s IT Act 2000, however, did not cover offenses such as phishing, 
cyberstalking, and cyber-harassment (Hindustan Times, 2006). To address these drawbacks, the 
IT (Amendment) Act 2008, added specific provisions to deal with and punish cyber-offenses 
such as publication of sexually explicit material, cyber-terrorism, Wi-Fi hacking, child 
pornography, identity theft, and spam (Deshpande, 2009). 
 
Privacy is also becoming an increasingly important issue. Recently legal institutions have 
recognized that citizens have a fundamental right to protect privacy. In September 2013, India's 
Supreme Court issued an interim order, which ruled that people cannot be required to have the 
Aadhaar identification in order to collect state subsidies (Ribeiro, 2014). Note that the 
government of India (GoI) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) indicated that it would require 
residents to have biometric IDs in order to collect government benefits. The project had set a 
target of 1 billion enrolments by 2015 (cio.de, 2014). The biometric ID assigns a person a 12-
digit number, which is called the Aadhaar number. It requires the collection of 10 fingerprints, 
iris scans and other information such as the name, date of birth and address and will be hosted in 
the eGovernance cloud platform. 
 
The country’s regulatory bodies overseeing various markets have also issued guidelines, best 
practices and regulations to monitor and control cybersecurity activities. For instance, India does 
not have data breach disclosure laws. However, the central bank, RBI has asked banks and 
financial institutions in the country to share information on data breach. The idea is to provide 
opportunities to learn about cyber-threats. For instance, a database of banking malware 
“signatures” would allow banks to set up firewalls against known malware types. For instance, 
the knowledge about breach in a bank would help other banks to look for the signatures of the 
same type of breach. Likewise, in April 2017, the Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority of India (IRDAI) has issued guideline, which require all insurance companies in the 
country to appoint a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) (DNA, 2017). 
 
Despite some enforcement activities, however, there is an enormous gap between laws on the 
books and the government’s capability to enforce laws. India’s most daunting challenge lies in 
overcoming the severe shortage of cybersecurity manpower. For instance, in 2004, of the 4,400 
police officers in India’s Mumbai city, only five worked in the cybercrime division (Duggal, 
2004). Likewise, in 2011, the police cybercrime cell of Delhi had only two inspectors (Nolen, 
2012). In 2012, the Delhi High Court noted the Delhi police website’s lack of functionality, 
calling it “completely useless” and “obsolete” (Nolen, 2012). 
 
In the same vein, consider India’s only Cyber Appellate Tribunal (CAT), which started 
functioning since 2006 (catindia.gov.in, 2014). It was reported in June 2014 that the tribunal had 
not adjudicated a single case during the previous three years due to the non-availability of the 
chairperson and judicial members (Singh, 2014). 
 
Cybercrime awareness level is very low among the law-enforcement community. 
 
For instance, it was reported that when a police officer was asked to seize the hacker’s computer 
in an investigation of a cybercrime in India, he brought the hacker’s monitor. In another 
cybercrime case, the police seized the CD-ROM drive from a hacker’s computer instead of the 
hard disk (Aggarwal, 2009). 
 
Overall, India is facing a severe shortage of cybersecurity professionals which hampers the 
country's ability to fight rapidly rising cybercrime (Kshetri, 2016c). For instance, a large number 
of IT security auditors are needed to evaluate the adequacy of controls in the management of 
project and business processes and validate whether the controls are effective (Hettigei 2005). 
An estimate suggested that in 2013, India had only 60 auditors (Doval 2013). Regarding the 
requirement of government agencies to conduct security auditing of IT infrastructures, websites 
and applications, it is important to note that most Indian government agencies’ websites are 
hosted by the National Informatics Centre (NIC), which was established by the GoI to promote 
IT culture among government organizations. It is argued that NIC-hosted websites are vulnerable 
to cyberattacks due to a shortage of manpower, especially IT security auditors. NIC outsources 
security audit works due to the lack of manpower. Likewise, in 2011, India’s central bank, 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced a set of recommendations, which include the formation 
of separate information security groups within banks and maintenance of adequate cybersecurity 
resources based on their size and scope of operation. The country is finding it difficult to enforce 
the RBI guidelines due to the lack of IT security auditors to validate banks’ cybersecurity 
practices (Bradbury 2013).  
 
In India about 10% cybercrimes are reported. Of the reported crimes, about 2% are registered. 
The conviction rate is as low as 2% (Hindustan Times, 2006). For instance, while most BPOs in 
Gurgaon had been cybercrime victims about 70% of the respondents did not report to the police 
(indiatimes.com, 2011). Most organizations reported doubt about competence, professionalism 
and integrity of the police in handling cybercrime cases. About 50% of the respondents not 
reporting thought that the cases are not dealt with professionally and 30% noted that they had 
“no faith” in Gurgaon police (indiatimes.com, 2011).  
 
In one way, there is a vicious circle: a) law enforcement agencies’ unwillingness to put efforts 
for investigating cybercrimes and their technological illiteracy indicate that they lack the skills 
and capability to address cybercrime related offenses; b) the survey conducted among Gurgaon-
based BPOs indicates that there are low cybercrime reporting rates because of the victims’ lack 
of confidence in law enforcement agencies; and c) cybercriminals may become more confident, 
resourceful and powerful because their offenses are not reported. 
 
As of 2006, no one charged for data fraud in India was convicted (Ribeiro, 2006). As of August 
2009, only four people were convicted for cybercrime (Aggarwal, 2009). Until 2010, there was 
not a single cybercrime related conviction in Bengaluru, the biggest offshoring hub. The total 
number of convicted cases by 2010 was estimated at less than 10 (Narayan, 2010). 
 
One reason behind the low rate of registration of cybercrime cases concerns the barriers, hurdles 
and hassles that confront the victims. In some cases, the police show unwillingness to take the 
extra work needed for the investigations (Narayan, 2010). There are reports that the police do not 
support the victim when they want to report a cybercrime case. Cybercrime victims have also 
complained that the police follow a long and inefficient process to build a criminal case (Anand, 
2011). 
 
3. Private Sector Initiatives and Market Mechanisms 
 
Due to escalating cyber-threats, cybersecurity has become an area of increasing priority among 
enterprises in India. Cybersecurity is reported to account for 30-40% of most overall IT budgets 
in some Indian companies (Goswami, 2017). Nonetheless, cybersecurity initiatives among Indian 
firms have been hampered by insufficient investments. According to Gartner, Indian 
organizations spent US$882 million in 2013 in cybersecurity, which was expected to increase to 
US$953 million in 2014 and US$1.06 billion in 2015. Over half of the cybersecurity spending 
goes to consulting, implementation, support and managed services (TechTarget, 2014). As a 
point of comparison, China’s cybersecurity spending is much higher, which is estimated to 
amount US$4.9 billion by 2015 (Kshetri, 2016b). 
 
3.1. Hollow Internet Diffusion and Weak Cybersecurity Measures 
 
The concept of “hollow diffusion” of the Internet among firms may help understand weak 
defense mechanisms (Otis and Evans 2003, p. 49). The basic idea behind “hollow diffusion” is 
simple: Many organizations digitizing their activities lack organizational, technological and 
human resources, and other fundamental ingredients needed to secure their system, which is the 
key for the long-term success of online businesses. 
 
As to organizational resources, on the cybersecurity front, one key global trend in organizational 
structure involves the tendency to create the position of Chief Information Security Officer 
(CISO). For instance, a 2014 PwC survey found that only 28% of over 500 companies surveyed 
had a CISO or Chief Security Officer (Damouni 2014). CEOs and board often consult CISOs to 
understand cyber risk, implement appropriate security controls and promote a culture of defense. 
One study suggested that 90% of CISOs are connected directly to their organizations’ top 
leadership team, and half of them were on the leadership team (Sweeney 2016). For instance, in 
India, except for few firms in banking, financial services and insurance, telecom, and business 
process outsourcing (BPO) it is rare to have a CISO in organizations (Pandya 2009). 
 
On the human resources front, demand of cybersecurity professionals greatly exceeds supply. 
According to international data corporation (IDC), only 22,000 security professionals were 
available in the country by early 2012 whereas the country needed 188,000 (Saraswathy, 2012). 
An adviser to the Information Systems Audit and Control Association noted that India needs 
300,000 cybersecurity professionals but there are about 30,000 such professionals (Gent, 2016). 
Citing a study by the Indian CERT, an indiatimes.com article reported that Indian organizations 
faced a shortage of about 400,000 trained cybersecurity professionals in 2013 (PTI, 2014). 
 
On the technological front, unlike some developing countries, India lacks major anti-virus 
companies. For instance, Moscow-based Kaspersky Labs is among the world’s biggest 
cybersecurity companies. Some other former second world economies also have top 
cybersecurity companies such as the Czech Republic’s AVG Technologies, Romania’s 
BitDefender and the Slovak Republic’s ESET (Kshetri, 2011). Likewise, the Belarusian firm 
VirusBlokAda was the first company to identify the Stuxnet code in June 2010 (Borland, 2010). 
India’s lack of high profile cybersecurity firms is related to the broader problems of the country’s 
low R&D profile. Due to India’s poor R&D and innovation performance, some liken economic 
activities in the Indian IT and offshoring industry to a “hollow ring.” An Economist article notes: 
“India makes drugs, but copies almost all of the compounds; it writes software, but rarely owns 
the result. … [it has] flourished, but mostly on the back of other countries’ technology” 
(Economist, 2007). 
 
India’s R&D profile is relatively lower compared to other BRIC economies. According to the 
World Bank, India had 100 researchers in R&D per million people in 2000 (the numbers for 
other BRIC economies were Brazil, 424; China, 548; and Russia, 3,451). Looking at more recent 
data, according to a report presented by Science and Technology Minister Kapil Sibal to the 
Rajya Sabha, the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, India had 156 researchers in R&D per 
million people in 2008. As a point of comparison, according to the World Bank, the 
corresponding numbers for other BRIC economies for 2008 were Brazil, 696; China, 1,199; and 
Russia, 3,152. Sibal suggested that universities in India were characterized by inferior R&D 
quality and capabilities (rediff.com, 2008). A related point is that much of the R&D in India is 
geared towards smaller projects that complement other innovation centres in Silicon Valley and 
other parts of the world (Economictimes, 2005). Moscow-based Kaspersky Lab’s CEO and 
Chairman Eugene Kaspersky put the issue this way: “ [Engineers in] China or India…are good if 
you just want something programmed, but if it’s about research, then it has to be Russia” 
(Robinson, 1998). 
 
The above said, there have been recent initiatives to accelerate startups in cybersecurity related 
areas. According NASSCOM, as of 2016, there were about 150 cybersecurity companies. A 
challenge has been limited access to funding for such startups. NASSCOM suggested that only 
40% of cybersecurity companies had received funding from investors (Srivastava, 2016). 
 
3.2. Underdeveloped Market for Cyber Insurance. 
 
Market forces and mechanisms are evolving that may enhance firms’ cybersecurity 
performances. For instance, the cyber liability insurance (data breach insurance) industry and 
market are are growing fast in industrialized economies (Kshetri, 2016b). A company is required 
to strengthen cybersecurity in order to buy coverage at a lower rate. A system that requires 
cybersecurity insurance thus raises cybersecurity S standards. That is, such insurance could help 
companies improve their cybersecurity S systems and put efforts to help secure policies 
(Business Insurance, 2014). Cyber liability insurance provides coverage for the theft or loss of 
first-party and third-party data. For the loss or theft of first-party data, an insurer may cover 
expenses related to notifying clients regarding the data breach, purchasing credit monitoring 
services for affected customers and launching a public relations campaign to restore the 
company’s reputation. Third-party coverage includes claims related to unlawful disclosure of a 
third-party's information and infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR) (McGrayer, 
McGinnis, Leslie, and Kirkland, 2014). 
 
India is regarded as an underdeveloped market for cyber liability insurance. Until as late as 2008, 
there was no insurance company in India that offered an anti-cybercrime policy for a company 
(Syed and D’monte, 2008). In the early 2017, insurers such as New India, National, ICICI 
Lombard, Tata AIG, HDFC Ergo and Bajaj Allianz offered cyber liability insurance (PTI, 2017). 
One estimate put the size of the Indian cyber liability insurance market in the range of US$14-19 
million (PTI, 2016). The cyber-Insurance market is thus relatively small and immature. 
 
3.3. The Information Technology-Business Process Management (IT&BPM) Sector 
 
A key characteristic that distinguishes India from other developing countries is the well 
developing information technology-business process management (IT&BPM) sector. The sector 
is expected to exceed $155 billion by FY17 (Venkatesh, 2017). The IT&BPM sector is arguably 
an enclave economy in India. Call centers in India have already spread from big cities to 
intermediate towns, and even to small towns in rural areas. In this sense, this sector deserves 
special attention and should be a prominent subject of discussions in the context of 
cybersecurity. 
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to stress that most high-profile and widely publicized 
cybercrimes in India are concentrated in the offshoring sector (Kshetri, 2010). The British 
Tabloid, Sun, reported that an Indian call center employee sold confidential information of 1,000 
bank accounts to its reporter working as an undercover (tribuneindia.com, 2005; Hindustan 
Times, 2006). In another case, call center workers at Pune, India, subsidiary of Mphasis, a 
provider of outsourcing services, transferred about US $500,000 from four Citibank customers’ 
accounts to their personal accounts (Schwartz, 2005; Fest, 2005). It was reported that in first- and 
second-tier cities, there are data brokers and data merchants, who buy data from people working 
in offshoring companies (Aggarwal, 2009). For instance, data frauds have been reported in call 
centers in Pune, Hyderabad, Bangalore, and Gurgaon. In a more recent case reported in March 
2012, two “consultants”, who claimed to be workers in Indian offshoring firms, met undercover 
reporters of The Sunday Times. They came with a laptop full of data and bragged that they had 
45 different sets of personal information on about 500,000 UK consumers. The information 
included credit card holders’ names, addresses, phone numbers, start and expiry dates and 
security verification codes. Data for sale also included information about mortgages, loans, 
insurance, phone contracts and television subscriptions (Gardner, 2012). 
 
Unsurprisingly firms in the Indian IT&BPM sector are taking strong cybersecurity measures to 
prevent attacks on computers by current and former employees (Kshetri, 2013). This is due 
primarily to address their clients’ fear that customer data will be stolen and even sold to 
criminals. For instance, call centre employees are required to undergo security checks which are 
considered to be “undignified” according to the Indian culture (The Economist, 2005). Firms 
have established biometric authentication controls for workers and banned cell phones, pens, 
paper and Internet/email access for employees for a long time (Fest, 2005). Computer terminals 
of firms in the IT&BPM sector (e.g., Mphasis) lack hard drives, email, CD-ROM drives, or other 
ways to store, copy or forward data (Engardio et al., 2004). Indian outsourcing firms also 
extensively monitor and analyze employee logs (Fest, 2005). 
 
India’s IT&BPM sector thus manages cybersecurity risk through effective industry self-
regulation. A highly visible private-sector actor on this front is the National Association of 
Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM). NASSCOM was established in 1988 as an 
industry-funded not-for-profit organization to contribute to the software industry’s development. 
NASSCOM aims to help the IT&BPM sector to be a “trustworthy, respected, innovative and 
society friendly industry in the world” and to “[e]stablish India as a hub for innovation and 
professional services” (NASSCOM, 2017). 
 
Owing to the rapid rise in data incidents, addressing cybersecurity issues has become 
increasingly important for the Indian IT&BPM sector’s success and vitality. NASSCOM 
launched a registry of IT employees, which allows employers to perform background checks on 
existing or prospective employees (Hindustan Times, 2006). Creation of criminal and public 
records databases has been a part of the program (Fest, 2005). 
 
In 2008, realizing the importance of an organization with an exclusive focus on data protection, 
NASSCOM established the Data Security Council of India (DSCI). The DSCI is a self-
regulatory member organization. DSCI’s mission is to create trust in Indian companies as global 
outsourcing service providers. Its focus on cybersecurity is to “[h]arness data protection as a 
lever for economic development of India through global integration of practices and standards 
conforming to various legal regimes” (https://www.dsci.in/taxonomypage/1). DSCI took over 
most of NASSCOM’s data protection–related activities. 
 
DSCI monitors member companies to ensure they adhere to cybersecurity standards. For 
instance, it requires members to self-police and provide additional layers of security at the 
infrastructure, applications and other levels. Companies failing to secure their data may be fined 
as much as US $1 million. Noncompliant companies might also lose NASSCOM and DSCI 
membership. 
 
NASSCOM and DSCI also help create awareness of the latest trends in cybercrime and 
cybersecurity. Security in cloud computing was one of the topics reviewed by the NASSCOM–
DSCI Information Security Summit 2009 (http://www.dsci.in/events/about/225) and every 
annual summit since then. In the DSCI Best Practices meeting held in June 2011, issues related 
to data protection in cloud computing and compliance were discussed (Haran, 2011). In 2011, 
the DSCI announced a plan to set up a cloud security advisory group that would develop a policy 
framework. The group would also advise the government on security and privacy issues in a 
cloud environment (Das, 2011). 
 
As of 2015, NASSCOM had more than 1,800 members, compared to 485 corporate members of 
DSCI. Although any company operating in India’s IT&BPM sector might have incentive to join 
NASSCOM, DSCI membership is especially important for companies for which cybersecurity is 
a key priority. NASSCOM membership fees vary from approximately US$450 to $100,000, 
depending on organization size. Many of NASSCOM’s members are also global firms from the 
U.S., Europe, Japan, China, South Korea and other countries. NASSCOM thus has a fairly high 
level of expertise and the financial resources to take various cybersecurity measures. 
 
A trade association’s enforcement strategy becomes efficient and powerful if a large number of 
firms join the association. NASSCOM ex-president Kiran Karnik addressed the importance of 
DSCI membership: “While it would be voluntary for the members to be part of the body, it 
would ensure at the same time that market forces make it mandatory for companies to register 
themselves.” (thehindubusinessline.com 2007). 
 
We noted above that India lacks major anti-virus companies. Recently NASSCOM and DSCI 
have taken various initiatives on this arena. During 2015-2016, the DSCI incubated 80 
cybersecurity startups (Goswami, 2017). 
 
4. Public–Private Partnership in Cybersecurity 
 
In the context of developing countries such as India, cybersecurity is in a nascent stage. Like 
other economic sectors characterized by nascentness, cybersecurity exhibits an underdeveloped 
regulatory structure. There is no template for policy development, assessment, and analysis. 
Developing templates, monitoring the behaviors of individuals and organizations, and enforcing 
regulations require extensive resources and expertise in such areas. However, most governments 
in developing countries are characterized by weak public administration, inadequate technical 
competence, and lack of political will in the implementation of economic and social policies 
(Pughm, 1999). 
 
But there is another point that is perhaps even more important. The way the Indian government is 
positioned does not allow it to spend state resources to support a new area at the cost of 
competing sectors. If policymakers allocate disproportionately more resources to develop 
modern sectors such as IT&BPM, they face stiff opposition from the mass of population that 
depends on the traditional economy. For instance, in India’s Andhra Pradesh state in the late 
1990s and the early 2000s, politicalopponents attacked then–Chief Minister Chandrababu 
Naidu’s decision to raise rice and electricity prices by cutting subsidies, which would worsen the 
welfare of most people. They also labeled his promotion of offshoring-related sectors and foreign 
capital as elitist. Naidu was voted out of office in 2004. For most the Indian population, data 
privacy and security are largely irrelevant. 
 
Due to the above limitations, the resulting regulatory vacuum needs to be addressed by 
collaborative actions of the public and the private sector actors. A number of such efforts stand 
out in the context of India. 
 
NASSCOM has engaged in advocacy and lobbying activities. In the mid-2000s, NASSCOM 
asked the Indian government to create a special court to try people accused of cybercrimes and 
other violations of the country’s Information Technology Act (Ribeiro, 2006). NASSCOM has 
also established a CyberCop committee and a member of the committee serves as a technical 
advisor to the Indian CyberCrime Investigation Cell. NASSCOM works with police officers, 
lawyers, and industry bodies to ensure the enforcement of cybersecurity regulations. NASSCOM 
meets with bar councils in different cities to educate legal communities. It also educates police 
officers about cybersecurity and trains them to recognize and prosecute cybercrimes. 
 
NASSCOM started working with Mumbai police since 2003 (Saravade & Saravade, 2007). 
NASSCOM helped police departments of cities such as Mumbai and Thane in establishing 
cybercrime units and providing training to officers. In 2005, NASSCOM announced a training 
initiative for Pune’s cybercrime unit, which caught data crime perpetrators from Mphasis (Cone, 
2005). A third cybercrime unit established in Bangalore in January 2007 has resources to train 
more than 1,000 police officers and other law-enforcement personnel annually. NASSCOM also 
offered to work with authorities in the U.K. and India to investigate cases involving identity theft 
(tribuneindia.com, 2005). 
 
DSCI helped to establish cyberforensic labs in Mumbai, Bengaluru, Pune and Kolkata. As of the 
early 2012, DSCI had organized 112 training programmes on cybercrime investigation and 
awareness, which benefited about 3,700 police officials, judiciary and public prosecutors 
(Kshetri, 2013). As of 2014, there were eight Cyber Labs in various Indian cities, which 
provided training to over 28,000 police officers (DSCI, 2014). 
 
Some PPP activities have been initiated by the government. Due to the country’s lack of 
indigenous technology and patents related to cybersecurity, the GoI has announced that it would 
provide financial incentives to Indian firms to acquire foreign firms with high-end cybersecurity 
technology (Thomas, 2012). The Ministry of External Affairs would explore possible targets 
worldwide through Indian embassies and missions. The fact that Indian government agencies 
have been under cyber-attacks, suspected from foreign governments, has provided a major 
motivation for such an approach. An Indian company which owns the technology gained through 
the acquisitions is required to give the government agencies an access to the intellectual property 
rights (IPR). 
 
 
5. Discussion and Implications 
 
The Indian government severely lacks the resources to develop and enforce cybersecurity-related 
regulations, standards, and guidelines. Some have rightly labeled India’s cybersecurity policy as 
“incomplete” and “all words and no action” (Desai, 2013) due to a lack of national cybersecurity 
action plan document or any guidelines regarding how the policy will be implemented. For 
instance, there is no clear action plan as to how the various goals proposed by the NCSP are 
going to be achieved. Overall, the NCSP lacks details of tangible actions and specific guidance, 
direction and procedures in order to achieve the vision of a secure cyberspace. The director of 
Israel's Military and Strategic Affairs Program and director of the cyber-warfare program at the 
Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) noted: "India has published 
its strategy .., but it is far away from what I call strategy ... It does not have the substance ... (and 
is) a very generic, high-level paper" (Alawadhi, 2014). 
 
NASSCOM and DSCI have been exemplary self-regulatory bodies, playing key roles in 
strengthening the IT&BPM sector’s cybersecurity orientation. They have played an equally 
important role in the PPP cybersecurity initiatives and worked with government and law 
enforcement agencies to formulate and enforce cybersecurity-related legislation. 
 
Trade associations such as NASSCOM and DSCI influence industry behaviors directly as well as 
through causal chains. Indirect effects entail mimicking behaviors of other actors that are 
perceived to be exemplary and have a higher degree of effectiveness ((Dickson et al. 2004; 
Lawrence et al., 2001). Exemplary firms serve as models for smaller firms to imitate. In such 
cases, knowledge flow takes place by externalities mainly due to interactions among firms or 
their employees. Trade associations are likely to accelerate this process by stimulating 
interaction among member companies. 
 
Regarding the active and influential roles played by NASSCOM and DSCI, it is worth noting 
that the Indian economy and society are less centralized with more room for trade associations to 
flourish and to have a strong voice (Frankel, 2006). Since the 1990s, there has been a shift from a 
state-dominated economic policy framework towards a decentralized one. Religious, social, 
economic and political associations have offered a viable set of examples encouraging the 
development of many new trade and professional associations (Frankel, 2006). A strong mutual 
interdependence between the state and the private economic actors, particularly organized 
business groups, has developed very quickly. 
 
The initiatives and responses of NASSCOM and DSCI can be considered to be the results of a 
hollow state and the thin institutions that hamper legislative and law enforcement efforts. For 
instance, India lacks standard identifiers like the U.S. Social security number making it difficult 
to check potential employees' backgrounds. It was reported that a thorough background check 
cost up to $1,000 per employee to (Schwartz, 2005). In response to the lack of such databases, in 
2005, NASSCOM announced a plan to launch a pilot employee-screening program called 
"Fortress India", which would allow employers to screen out potential workers who have 
criminal records. Subsequently it was developed into the National Skill Registry (NSR), which 
allows employers to perform background checks on existing or prospective employees. It is a 
voluntary registry for call center employees. 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
 
Like other developing economies, India faces problems such as ineffective regulation, a lack of 
poorly trained law enforcement manpower and up-to-date technology. These factors have led to 
under-resourced and underdeveloped institutional capacity on the cyber front. As is the case of 
the rest of the world, India faces a severe shortage of cybersecurity professionals. This is among 
the key obstacle in addressing the growing cybercrimes in the country. A strong civil society has 
been recognized as a crucial feature of India’s political development. This phenomenon has also 
allowed private-sector participants such as NASSCOM to play an important role in strengthening 
cybersecurity. Indeed, Indian offshoring industry provides a remarkable example of industry 
government collaboration in combating cybercrimes. 
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